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Texas Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 2
GETTING TO KNOW: HONORING WOMEN IN
LAW AND IN FACT
Lynne Henderson*
"Just What Part of No Don't You Understand?"'
As the past year has at times painfully demonstrated, two decades of
feminist law reform efforts to hold men responsible for raping women have
yielded disappointing results. 2  Rape myths, woman-blaming, and
resistance to taking rape seriously flourish, and successful prosecution of
cases not meeting the stereotype of real rape, while no longer impossible,
remains improbable. At the same time, the rate of rape and sexual
violence against women continues to grow in this country. Even conserva-
tively, the rate of rape of adult women in the United States is appallingly
high. If the rape of minor females were included in the statistics, rather
than being classified as-(mere) molestations, the rate would probably be,
much higher. As a rape survivor who is also a lawyer and a law
Professor, Indiana University at Bloomington School of Law. B.A., Stanford University, 1975;
J.D., Stanford Law School, 1979. 1 would like to thank the past add present editors of the Texas Journal
of Women and the Law for their kind invitation to speak at their conference, New Perspedives on Women
and Voence, and for all their help in turning a speech into an article. I wotild also lke to thank all the
students and faculty who made the conference a special and enjoyable occasion to meet and learn. Finally,
thanks to Joseph Hoffmann, Lauren Robel, and Susan Williams for their help and comments on drafts.
1. Phrase on t-shirt.
2. Of the three heavily publicized sexual assault trials in the last year, two resulted in acquittals and
one in a conviction. The cases were the William Kennedy Smith case, the St. John's case, and the Mike
Tyson case. FLORIDA V. SMrTH: A TRIAL TRAINING VWEOTAPE (American Lawyer 1992); People v.
Gubrinowitz No. 5413-90; State of Indiana v. Michael G. Tyson, Cause No. 49G04-9109-CF-116245. See
Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL 5 (1992) (discussing the Smith and Tyson cases); see
also Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, I1 LAw & PHIL 127 (1992) (exploring the relationship
of law to the social reality of rape). The intense publicity surrounding these trials undoubtedly masked the
many other cases in which men were either not prosecuted or were not convicted in circumstances
involving acquaintance rape.
3. See David Johnston, Survey Shows Number of Rapes Far Higher Than Offcial Figures, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at A9 (noting that estimates of the number of rapes in 1990 in the study sponsored
by the National Victim Center, the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center, and the Medical
University of South Carolina, "did not include female children and adolescents or rapes of boys and men"
and that "the estimates probably constitute less than half of rapes experienced by all Americans during
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professor, I find the criminal law's continued failure to deter and punish
rape horrifying. I believe that the problem is not so much with the law on
the books in many jurisdictions as with the law in action, and with cultural
images of sex and women. Many existing statutes do, or easily could,
prohibit much of what feminists assert is rape,4 but the interpretation and
application of rape laws sharply limit their efficacy. 5
The thesis of this Article is that a major explanation for the law's
failure to have a significant impact on the rate of rape in the United States
arises from our cultural beliefs about heterosexuality and rape. In the
Article, I argue that a number of cultural conventions and beliefs about
heterosexuality transform mosf rape into "sex" and not criminal conduct.
Of these conventions, I believe that common beliefs about the morality of
heterosexuality and cultural understandings about what constitutes normal
heterosexual practice account for much of the failure of law reform to
reduce the rate of rape and sexual abuse. As a number of feminists have
observed, both heterosexuality and rape are defined in male, rather than
female, terms, including the terms of the morality of heterosexuality and
assertions about what women want or are as sexual beings. The morality
of heterosexuality that we have inherited, and often have internalized,
creates a presumption of moral innocence for men and a presumption of
moral guilt for women in sexual interactions. In cases of rape, then, men
are presumed innocent and women guilty at the outset.
A second influential cultural belief is that female submission to male
sexual dominance or aggression is natural, romantic, and erotic. Related
to this is the eroticization of passivity, power, and violence presented in
cultural images ranging from advertisements, to television, to soft-core
pornography, to snuff films. 6 If violence, or being overcome, or being
"swept away" is what is erotic, then it is difficult to argue that being
1990"); see also Unsettling Report on an Epidemic of Rape: The Latest Survey Reveals That Majority of
Victims Are Minors, TIME, May 4, 1992, at 15, 15 (reporting on a federally funded survey published by
the National Victim Center which found that 683,000 women were raped in the United States in 1990,
"five times the number of sexual assaults reported by the Justice Department for the same year" and that
of the more than 12 million women estimated to be rape victims, 61% were under age 18 and that 3 out
of 10 were under 11 years old).
4. The major exceptions to this statement are the Model Penal Code's provisions on rape. Despite
20 years of feminist efforts, the drafters of the Code have not seen a reason to eliminate the bias in the
model sexual assault laws. The Code provisions applicable to rape and related offenses contain a marital
rape exemption, a promiscuity defense, a prompt complaint requirement, and a corroboration requirement.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
5. See SUSAN ESTICH, REAL RAPE 89-91 (1987) (summarizing rape reform laws and noting that
courts continue to interpret rape statutes narrowly).
6. The film Not a Love Story provides a powerful summary of images ranging from magazines to
strippers to snuff films to billboard advertisements. See NOT A LovE STORY: A FILM ABOUT
PoRNOGRAPtty (Nat't Film Board of Can.); see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and
the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 82 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 352, 366-67 (1988) (summarizing reactions to pornography and the film Not a Love Story).
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ignored and overcome and forcibly penetrated is rape rather than sex.
Because these stories of morality and sexuality provide the interpretive lens
through which rape is viewed by men, women, prosecutors, judges, and
juries, most men who rape women are never held legally responsible for
their conduct, and most women who are raped have no chance at successful
legal recourse.
Part I of this Article examines and criticizes the cultural morality of
heterosexuality that relieves men of moral responsibility for their heterosex-
ual actions. Part II analyzes a cultural story of heterosexuality that renders
dominance and submission in heterosexual practice the norm. Part I
argues that feminists must not only tell the story of rape, but also develop
a positive account of heterosexuality that can challenge and change the
prevailing stories in this culture. Finally, Part IV suggests that the next
area of legal reform should focus on undermining the male innocence side
of the story by assigning the risk of error and punishment to men rather
than women. It insists that the law take seriously the woman's voice of
heterosexual pain and pleasure: the only way the woman's story will be
understood is if it is clear that intercourse without consent is not just bad
sex, it is rape. Part IV also argues that the focus of sexual assault and rape
statutes should be on consent, and that as soon as a woman indicates her
unwillingness to engage in heterosexual activity, the man is guilty of rape
or sexual assault if he persists. Such legal reform will not be easy; it is
nothing less than a struggle to redefine sex and heterosexuality, and men
know this. To challenge the male innocence side of the story, we must be
willing to engage in a struggle for the power to define the world of sex and
heterosexuality on women's, as well as men's, terms. The challenge may
begin with law, but ultimately the struggle must take place in the larger
culture.
I. Stories of Heterosexuality: Relieving Men of Responsibility
The story of male innocence and female guilt implies that men are not
morally responsible for their heterosexual conduct, while women are
morally responsible for their own heterosexual conduct as well as that of
men.7  At the very least, this conception of heterosexuality traces back
to the story of Adam and Eve.8 For example, the Judeo-Christian
tradition, which has largely shaped moral thought in the United States,
frequently emphasized the story of male innocence and female guilt. As
Uta Ranke-Heinemann argues in Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven, the
Roman Catholic Church has reinforced female guilt and male innocence
7. For a more complete discussion, see Henderson, supra note 2, at 130.
8. See Genesis 3:1-24 (telling the biblical story of the Fall of humankind).
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themes in its theology and doctrines throughout its history.9 In the
thirteenth century, Albert the Great, who had asserted that the Virgin Mary
was the only moral woman, declared that "Eve, by contrast, had left all
women a double and triple 'woe' . . . first, the woe of the temptation to
concupiscence, second, the woe of depravity in the sexual act, and third,
the woe of excessive lust in conception." 10 Thomas Aquinas argued that
women were more inclined to sexual incontinence than men, and that
sexual pleasure with women destroyed men's reason and control." The
Roman Catholic Church has continued to condemn women's sexuality in
much the same way in the present. 12
The Roman Catholic Church has not been the only religion to
condemn women for the Fall or for being a source of temptation to men.
Protestants have also held women morally guilty for sexuality. Early
Puritan ministers blamed women for "wearing immodest dress" and
thereby "enticing men into sexual sin." 13 In the 182bs, moral purity
campaigns led by Protestants in the United States emphasized women's
sexual depravity and condemned some women as a threat to men. 14
Preachers today exhort women to modesty, lest they tempt men. Judaism,
too, has a tradition of viewing women as the source of sexual temptation
and distraction.15  Islamic law and custom holds that a woman's
uncovered hair is enough to drive men to distraction. 16  And, in her
critique of the Black Muslim movement, bell hooks observed:
9. UTA RANKE-HEINEMANN, EUNUCHS FOR THE KINGDOM OF HEAvEN: WOMEN, SEXUALITY AND
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (Peter Heinegg trans., 1st ed. 1990) (arguing that the hostility of the Catholic
Church to sexual pleasures includes a notion of women as unclean and has manifested itself in such
teachings as the Church's overemphasis of the virgin birth, the promotion of celibacy for priests, and the
ban on contraceptives).
10. Id. at 180.
11. Id. at 188-89.
12. E.g., id. at 344-45 (discussing 'Mariology" the church's teaching about Mary, and how it
separates Mary from all other impure women).
13. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERs: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN
AMEICA 18 (1988).
14. Id. at 142-43 ("[C]lergy condemned 'depraved women' who led astray inexperienced young men
in the city.").
15. See, e.g., DAVID NovAK, LAW AND THEOLOGY IN JUDAISM 144-45 (1976) (noting that women
have been excluded from rituals such as reading the Torah for the community and that such exclusion is
based on a desire to avoid the presence of females who would provide an "erotic distraction for male
worshippers").
16. For example, in the Islamic fundamentalist country of Iran, "'research proved female hair had a
kind of radiance' that might tempt men," according to Iran's first President under the revolution,
Abolhassen Bani-Sadr. Elaine Sciolino, From Back Seat in Iran, Murnmurs of Discontent, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 23, 1992, at El7. In those early years "women were insulted, arrested, fined and even lashed" for
dressing in violation of the dress code. Id. Today women are still subject to harassment even though the
dress code has eased. Id. See also James LeMoyne, Some Saudi Women Push Changes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dee. 8, 1990, at A6 ("In public, Saudi women are required to wear a black robe, covering almost all their
body and usually a veil ... [and] to cover their hair and face as well;" allowing women to drive "could
lead to temptations that would hurt the sanctity of women").
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In American patriarchy, all women are believed to embody sexual evil
.... Within the Muslim movement, the black man who once looked
upon black women as devalued property could suddenly see her as
elevated to the respected status of wife and mother, that is, after she
wrapped her head in cloth and covered her body in long skirts and
dresses. 17
Overall, those religions that have influenced American culture have
perpetuated a moral story of male innocence and female guilt in sex.
Philosophers have reinforced the story of male innocence and female
guilt. In a dramatic example of the philosophic subscription to the story
of sexual innocence and guilt, Carole Pateman discusses the work of
Rousseau in The Sexual Contract.18  Pateman argues that Rousseau
viewed women as the source of sexual temptation and irrationality:
Women, unlike men, cannot control their 'unlimited desires . . . .
Women have only modesty, and if they did not have this constraint, 'the
result would soon be the ruin of both [sexes], and mankind would perish
by the means established for preserving it .... Men would finally be
[women's] victims and would see themselves dragged to death without
ever being able to defend themselves. ' 19
While other philosophers may not have been as explicit about male
'innocence and female guilt, none believed women to be as morally
developed as men; by inference, women arguably are a source of
immorality.
Science has contributed its own stories of male innocence and female
guilt. For men sex is a drive, an instinct that requires fulfillment.20 The
field of sociobiology has asserted that men are innocent in trying to ensure
the survival of their genes. 21 Women, on the other hand, withhold sex
in order to protect their gene pool and are guilty of frustrating males. 2
In this view, not only is male promiscuity natural and desirable, but so is
rape, which is described as "nothing more sinister than males' efforts to
spread their genes around." 23 Less directly, the science of human sexual
17. BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 110 (1981).
18. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXuAL CoNTRAcr 96 (1988).
19. Id. at 97 (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION 358-59 (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 1979)).
20. See ALFRED C. KINSEY Er AL., SEXUAL BEIAyIOR IN THE HuMAN FEMALE 682 (1953)
(discussing a scientific report that concluded that men are "constantly being aroused" whereas women are
not and arguing that "[b]ecause of this constant arousal, most males, particularly younger males, may be
nervously disturbed unless they can regularly carry their responses through to the point of orgasm").
21. See DAvID BARASH, THE WHISPERiNOS WITHIN 47-48 (1979) ("For males reproduction is easy,
a small amount of time, a small amount of semen, and the potential evolutionary return is very great if
offspring are produced .... A genetically influenced tendency to 'play fast and loose'-'love 'em and
leave 'em'-may well reflect more biological reality than most of us care to admit.").
22. See Id. (arguing that females are discriminating in choice of male sexual partners in order to
ensure the best evolutionary outcome in offspring).
23. Ruth Hubbard, The Poltical Nature of "Human Nature," in THEORETICAL PERSPECnvES ON
19931
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
behavior developed by Havelock Ellis in the late nineteenth century
emphasized that "[m]en were characteristically active, aggressive, sexually
insistent, and easily aroused."' Aggressive sexuality therefore is a
natural and, by inference, an unavoidable and innocent part of men's
essential nature. Accordingly, much of science reinforces beliefs that
women are temptresses and that men are legitimately helpless in the face
of that temptation.
The stories of male innocence and female guilt are not limited to
religious, philosophical, or scientific texts; they permeate popular cultural
beliefs and conventional sexual morality as well. One does not have to
look far to see manifestations of the male innocence-female guilt story.
For example, in 1991 columnist Ann Landers published the following letter
in her column:
Dear Ann Landers: I hope I can put into words my personal theory on
date rape...
There is no hiding a man's arousal. Usually the female enjoys
bringing it on every bit as much as the man enjoys the experience. It is
all part of human nature.
The problem is that with many men, there is only one way to end
arousal and that is ejaculation. At the height of ecstacy, does the female
partner think the man is going to excuse himself, go... and take a cold
shower? No way. He wants the final act.
... If the female partner has made up her mind that there is NOT
going to be penetration, she should put a stop to the proceedings at the
very first sign of male arousal. A female who doesn't want the total
sexual experience should have healthy respect for a flashing red warning
light. If she goes beyond this point she could be in trouble.2S
This letter tells a story of heterosexuality in which women are in
control of sex, even though it is defined on men's terms. Sex equals
penetration from the male point of view. Female pleasure is defined in
terms of arousing the male, not female arousal. He is not responsible, she
is. Men are incapable of being sexually aroused and then going without
intercourse; as Morrison Torrey recently remarked, this is "the runaway
locomotive" theory of male sexuality.26 Sexual contact or play of almost
any kind becomes a justification for penetration. As long as the woman
acts early and fast enough, all power is situated within her; otherwise, men
are entitled to intercourse. Ann Landers seems to approve: "I see a great
deal of logic in what you have said," she responded. "The female who
SEXUAL DwFrEcns 63, 67 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
24. D'EMIuo & FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 224.
25. Ann Landers, A Male's Theory on Date Rape, S.F. SUNDAY EXAMINER/CHRON., Aug. 4, 1991,
at C2 (quoting letter from W.B., Brookline, Mass.).
26. Conversation with Morrison Torrey, Professor, De Paul College of Law (Mar. 6, 1992).
[Vol. 2:41
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agrees to hours of petting but does not want to complete the sex act is
asking for trouble and she will probably get it." 27 In other words, she
asked for it. As Jane Aiken observed nearly ten years ago, this kind of
belief in men's "natural" sexuality has led courts to hold women
responsible for male sexual behavior under a kind of irresistible impulse
approach,28 and therefore to exculpate many men who rape.
The work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on metaphor and
cognition29 provides a different source for understanding cultural
perceptions of heterosexuality, male innocence, and female guilt.30
Timothy Beneke uses Lakoff and Johnson's theory of cognitive framing
through metaphor to examine metaphors for heterosexual desires and activi-
ties. 31  He notes that male metaphors for sex depict women as
commodities and reflect status, hostility, control, and dominance.
32
Lakoff, in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, in turn uses Beneke's
work in noting the parallels between metaphors for anger and metaphors
for lust in this culture. 3 In an analysis of the metaphors used by a "mild
mannered librarian" interviewed by Beneke, Lakoff notes:
The speaker assumes that A WOMAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HER
PHYSICAL APPEARANCE and since PHYSICAL APPEARANCE IS
A PHYSICAL FORCE, he assumes that if she looks sexy,. . . she is
using her sexy appearance as a force on him .... The speaker also
assumes that SEXUAL EMOTIONS ARE A PART OF HUMAN
NATURE and that A PERSON WHO USES A FORCE IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EFFECT OF THAT FORCE. It follows
that A WOMAN WITH A SEXY APPEARANCE IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR AROUSING A MAN'S SEXUAL EMOTIONS. 34
Because forcing sex on another against her will is immoral, Lakoff writes,
the speaker is forced to conclude that a man must inhibit his sexual
emotions to act morally.35 In turn, this humiliates the speaker, because
27. Landers, supra note 25, at C2.
28. Jane H. Aiken, Differentiating Sex from Sex: The Male Irresistblelnipulse, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 357, 375 (1983-84) ("The courts perpetuate sex discrimination by justifying rape with
the assumption that the mixing of sexes inherently causes strong and sometimes uncontrollable impulses
in men.").
29. GEORcE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LVE BY 156 (1980).
30. See id. ("Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus
be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce
the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling
prophecies.").
31. TIoMTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE 11-23 (1982).
32. Id. at 11-16 (discussing how men metaphorically structure their sexual experiences with women).
33. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FImE, AND DANGEROUs THINGS 412-15 (1987) (analyzing a passage
from Beneke's book to support the suggestion that conceptual metaphors not only provide ways for
discussing and understanding lust, but also enter into reasoning).
34. Id. at 413 (analyzing interview in BENKmcE, supra note 31, at 42-45).
35. Id.
1993]
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he must suppress his own natural instinct.36 Thus, she injures him, and
she deserves to be punished. The speaker says: "'Just the fact that they
can come up to me and just melt me and make me feel like a dummy
makes me want revenge. They have power over me so I want power over
them."' 37  Lakoff observes, "American culture contains within it a
sufficient stock of fairly common metaphors and folk theories which, when
put together . . . , can actually provide what could be viewed as a
'rationale' for rape." 38 If it is the woman who has power over the man,
it is she who is morally culpable; the man is innocent.
Consistent with the Landers column and the Lakoff analysis are a
number of cultural judgments about female guilt in sexual encounters.
Women whose appearance, manner, or style is perceived as sexy by men
are considered to be seductive, "asking for it," and consenting. Thus,
common advice to women on how to avoid rape assigns responsibility to
them for controlling male sexual reactions. Routinely, women are told to
dress in a nonsexual manner, to avoid strange males, to avoid flirting
(which can simply mean being friendly to a man). Women are told that on
a date they must not drink; they must determine whether men are interested
in them as persons; they must avoid going to a man's house or room; they
should pay their own way on a date if at all possible (if he spends money
on you, then he's entitled to sex); and, finally, they should not engage in
other forms of sexual contact unless they are willing to have sexual
intercourse with the man. While such advice might be given to women to
"protect" them, it often justifies blaming women when they are raped.
Combined with the probability that few men are told that they should not
interpret the woman's agreement to have dinner or to visit their rooms, or
her intoxication as an invitation to intercourse, it helps to illuminate our
repeated failures to hold men responsible for rape. Indeed, several studies
of how rape is treated in the legal system strongly suggest that larger
cultural beliefs in male innocence and female responsibility always and
already affect the interpretation of an event as rape or not.39
Gary LaFree's extensive study of rape prosecutions in Indianapolis
found that themes of male innocence and female guilt affected the
interpretation of rape by legal actors and jurors. 4° The presumption of
innocence became a presumption of entitlement to sex, at least where the
defendant was not a total stranger who jumped out of the bushes.41 If
36. Id. at413-14.
37. BE ,EK, supra note 31, at 44.
38. L.AKoFF, supra note 33, at 415.
39. See, e.g., GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTMUCTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 53 (1989).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 222 ("Mhe victim-defendant relationship . . . [had] a significant effect on juror's
[V/ol. 2:41
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rape complainants had been drinking, had sexual experience outside of
marriage, had even a passing acquaintance with the man, or otherwise
engaged in all too traditional "nontraditional" 42 behavior, police did not
fie charges, prosecutors did not prosecute, and juries did not convict in the
few cases that actually made it to trial. 43  Particularly in "consent
defense" cases-those cases in which the defendant argued that the woman
agreed to intercourse-jurors relied on their perceptions of the victim's
moral character and the defendant's resemblance to their stereotype of how
a rapist would look and behave, rather than on the evidence: "[F]or jurors
the victim's moral character was even more important than medical
evidence or victim injury."44 Another study of the effects of Michigan's
reform of its rape laws similarly found that perceptions of the
complainant's character influenced official decisions in rape cases to an
important degree.45 Yet another study found that reform of rape laws did
not significantly affect police and prosecutorial attitudes to the crime and
its victims in six large cities.46 From police officer to prosecutor to
judge and, especially, to jury, the societal myth of male innocence and
female responsibility obstructs the successful prosecution of men who rape.
Indianapolis recently provided a widely-publicized national example
of the translation of a rape into a story of female guilt and male innocence
by -many men and women in the United States. Before the trial of boxer
Mike Tyson, condemnation of the victim was standard fare in the local and
national media.47 During the rape trial, the newspapers and television
shows were filled with condemnation of the victim, and praise for the
defendant. Much of the black community criticized the prosecution and
condemned the trial as racist;48 the "official" black response remained
evaluations. ... [Amny prior relationship between the victim and the defendant reduced the chances that
jurors would consider the defendant guilty.").
42. Id. at 217 (describing behavior such as the use of marijuana, birth control pills, and explicit
language as influencing a juror's verdict).
43. See Marianne Wesson, Mysteries of Violence and Self Defense" Myths for Men, Cautionary Tales
for Women, I TEx. J. WoMEN & L. 1, 17-21 (1992) (discussing a study which reveals that nonconforming,
behavior negatively affects police arrest decisions, impacts prosecutors expectations of results at trial, and
causes juries to acquit defendants).
44. LAFREE, supra note 39, at 218.
45. See JEANNE C. MARSH Er Ai-, RAPE AND THE LIMTrrs OF LAW REFouM 95-108 (1982) ("The
evidence suggests that if a victim has ever been receptive to the assailant's sexual advances-from 'flirting'
with him to having consensual intercourse with him in the past-then officials will be likely to discount her
report.).
46. See Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Szx Urban
Jurisdictions, 25 LAw & Soc'Y Rnv. 117 (1991) (concluding from studies in Detroit, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. that the ability of rape reform legislation to affect case
outcomes is limited).
47. Some of what follows is based on my conversations with Joe Gelarden, the reporter for the
Indianapolis Star who covered the trial. See also Phil Berger, Can Trial of Tyson Be Fair?, N.Y. TIMES
(Late Edition), Jan. 27, 1992, at C7 (reporting a sportscaster's comment that many phone-in poll callers
were supporting Tyson and saying the "victim did, after all, go to his room late at night").
48. Interview with an African American female attorney in Indianapolis who had contacted the media
1993]
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strangely silent about the fact that the victim was also African
American.49 Many asserted that Tyson was the one raped by the process,
rather than Desiree Washington, his 18-year old victim.50 Prayer vigils
were held for Tyson, but not Washington. 51 His mistreatment of other
women meant that she knew he wanted sex. She had to have been
consenting, rather than naive and star-struck, when she agreed to go out
with him and to stop at his hotel room. She went to his room and broke
curfew; therefore, she was blameworthy and consenting. Her nightmares,
her injuries, her voice did not count for much; indeed, the New York Times
barely noted the evidence of her vaginal injuries in its coverage.52  She
was lying, vengeful, and greedy according to one of the defense stories.
Apparently, her credibility would be lost if she pursued her legally
recognized rights and remedies as a victim of a violent crime.53
Appallingly, much of the condemnation of the victim appeared to be
coming from women, including, no doubt, women who at ages seventeen
and eighteen made "mistakes" similar to Desiree Washington's. And
although the jury convicted Tyson of rape and deviate sexual conduct, the
to emphasize that she and others disagreed with the sympathy shown Mike Tyson by certain churchez and
spokespersons for the community; her response was ignored. See also Karen Baker-Fletcher, Tyson's
Defenders and the Church of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1992, at E17 (criticizing the president of
National Baptist Convention and male members of the black community for perpetuating sexism and
discrediting black women).
49. Comparisons to the acquittal of William Kennedy Smith were frequently invoked as part of the
claim of racism, but the prosecution's evidence in the Tyson case was stronger and the victim less subject
to impeachment. There may have been some unconscious racism involved in thejury's verdict, but it is
difficult to know to what degree race affected the decision to convict him. The defense portrayal of Tyson
as looking for sex may have played into stereotypical beliefs about the black man as sexual predator in the
minds of the ten white jurors. A similar case without that evidence or with a white defendant and a white
victim might have been decided differently.
50. See, e.g., Lisa L. Ryckman, Tyson Takes Stand to Deny Rape, THE HERALD-TIMES (Bloomington,
Ind.), Feb. 8, 1992, at Al, A7 (noting that Tyson fans engaged in a shouting match with demonstrators
protesting rape outside the court house, with one fan yelling that Tyson was being "raped right now").
51. See Hank Lowenkron, Tyson Misses Prayers for Justice at Church Service in His Honor, THE
HERALD-TIMES (Bloomington, Ind.), Feb. 3, 1992, at A7 (reporting that Tyson missed a "'prayer vigil for
justice' in his rape trial" that he was scheduled to attend); E. R. Shipp, Notes from Tyson Trial: Many Say
it Ain't So, N.Y. TIMES (Late Edition), Feb. 3, 1992, at C7 ("At a rally sponsored . . . by the...
[National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.], local churches and Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam, several
hundred people cheered when ... told . . . 'our brother needs us.' As Tyson sat in the pulpit. . . with
... ministers and elected officials, they wrapped him in their affection with songs and prayers.").
52. Compare Phil Berger, Tyson's Driver Says Woman Was Dazed After Date, N.Y. TIMES (Late
Edition), Feb. 2, 1992, §8, at 1, 2 (noting briefly doctor's testimony of vaginal abrasions) with Lisa L.
Ryckman, Doctor Supports Accuser's Story, THE HERAIJ.-TIMES (Bloomington, Ind.), Feb. 2, 1992, at
C1 (reporting in detail doctor's testimony of vaginal abrasions).
53. Tyson's appellate counsel, Alan Dershowitz, has asserted that Washington's plans to bring a civil
suit and market a future book and movie rights gave her "a motive to lie." Tyson Case on Appeal, TilE
HERAILD-TIMES (Bloomington, Ind.), Dec. 17, 1992 (discussing second appeal filed by Dershowitz claiming
that Washington met with lawyers about civil suit and media rights). Washington did file a civil suit in
U.S. District Court in June of 1992 after the criminal trial. Tyson Is Suedfor Damages by Rape Victim,
Los ANOaS TIMES, June 23, 1992, at C3. In any event, a victim should not have to surrender her
credibility if she chooses to pursue the legal remedy to which she is entitled.
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commentary after the conviction has "become a familiar litany: 'The jury
is wrong. It's her fault. What was she doing in Mike Tyson's room at 2
a.m.? What did she expect?'" 54
II. Stories of Heterosexuality: Dominance and Submission
Not only is the theme of male innocence and female guilt a major one
in our culture, there is also a story of male dominance and female
submission in heterosexual sex. Dominance and submission, male
aggression and female passivity, are not only considered "natural," but
they also frequently define the erotic in this culture. Thus, this stereotype
of what is "natural" human sexuality also affects understandings of
romance in heterosexual relationships, and the stereotype is celebrated by
the pornography industry.55  By dominance and submission, I do not
mean that sexual activity with another human being may involve intrusions
on one's physical and psychic boundaries, nor am I concerned with
questions of "who's on top" or questions of who is active and who is
passive during a particular sexual encounter. Rather, by dominance and
submission I mean to describe the notion that heterosexuality is based on
power in some essential way: that females are always passive and to be
overborne-and that males are always active and overbearing, a notion that
in turn justifies the eroticization of abusive power and violence in sex.
Stories of male dominance and persistence and female passivity and
submission might appear to create a paradox with stories of male innocence
and female guilt. But the stories are not as contradictory as they first
seem. Indeed, the two primary definitions of seduction suggest a link.
Webster's defines "seduction" as "the enticement of a female to unlawful
sexual intercourse without use of force" and "something that attracts or
charms." 56 But the "use of force" limitation in seduction appears to be
a narrow one. As Susan Estrich observed about rape law, "[The force
standard guarantees men freedom to intimidate women and exploit their
weaknesses, as long as they [the women] don't 'fight' with them." 57 If.
seduction is male persuasion without force, it does not preclude males from
overriding female wishes, a form of domination. If seduction is female
enticement of men, the male innocence story holds. Finally, if force is
54. R. Joseph Gelarden, Western Culture's Urge to Blame the Woman Has a Long History,
INfrApousS'TAR, Mar. 1, 1992, at Fl.
55. See generally infra text accompanying notes 64-68; cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMtNST THEORY OF STATE 197 (1989) ("[Plornography ... institutionalizes the sexuality of male
supremacy. . fus[ing] the erotization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male
and female").
56. WEBsmR's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1062 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds. 1988).
57. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1118 (1986).
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narrowly interpreted, much dominating, forceful, behavior is simply seen
as seduction. The force standard "makes clear that the responsibility and
blame for [frightening] seductions belong with the woman."58 Thus, the
paradox of women as both submissive to, and guilty for, men's sexual
experiences is played out in the context of seduction.
The dynamic of power and violence becomes evident in several
authors' discussions of the erotic. Lakoff concludes his analysis of the
metaphors of sexuality that can rationalize rape, discussed in Part I,59 by
noting, "What I find sad is that we appear to have no metaphors for a
healthy mutual lust. The domains we use for comprehending lust are
HUNGER, ANIMALS, HEAT, INSANITY, MACHINES, GAMES,
WAR, and PHYSICAL FORCES." 6' These metaphors certainly can
justify aggression and irresponsibility; metaphors of war, animals, and
physical forces, and to some extent insanity and games, all are deeply
resonant with violent erotic images.
The extent of the influence of these images might be found in the
attention given one of their advocates, Camille Paglia, 61 who was recently
"honored" by Newsweek as a member of the "cultural elite." 62 Paglia
confirms and advocates these violent metaphors as "natural" in a mean-
spirited attack on the anti-pornography work of Catharine MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin: "[P]ornography... shows the dark truth about nature,
concealed by the artifices of civilization. Pornography is about lust, our
animal reality that will never be fully tamed by love. Lust is elemental,
aggressive, asocial." 63 One need not go to the extremes of woman-hating
manifested by Camille Paglia to find support for the violent image of
human sexuality. In an article on date rape, Time quoted journalist
Stephanie Gutmann: "How can you make sex completely politically correct
and completely safe? ... What a horribly bland, unerotic thing that would
be! Sex is, by nature, a risky endeavor, emotionally. And desire is a
violent emotion." 64 Similarly, Ann Snitow, writing about bodice rippers
as pornography for women, states:
In recent debates, sex books that emphasize both male and female sexual
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
60. LAKoFF, supra note 33, at 415.
61. See CAMILLE PAGuA, SEXUAL PERSONAE: ART AND DECADENCE FROI NEFERTITI TO EMILY
DICKINSON xiii (1991) (arguing through emphasis on "the truth in sexual stereotypes and on the biologic
basis of sex differences" that the "brutal pagan forces" of sex and nature still flourish in western art,
eroticism, astrology, and pop culture).
62. The Newsweek 100, NEwswEE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 36, 38 ("Cultural terrorist, author. She incenses
feminists, calls date rape 'sex as usual,'... . Why is the Ivy League so frightened?").
63. Camille Paglia, Guest Opinion: "The Return of Carry [sic] Nation", PLAYBOY, Oct. 1992, at 36,
38. If I were an animal other than a human, I would take umbrage at this remark.
64. Nancy Gibbs, When Is It Rape?, TIME, June 3, 1991, at 48, 53.
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feeling as a sensuality that can exist without violence are being called
"erotica" to distinguish them from "pornography." This distinction
blurs more than it clarifies the complex mixture of elements that make
up sexuality. "Erotica" is soft core, soft focus; it is gentler and tenderer
sex than that depicted in pornography. Does this mean true sexuality is
diffuse while only perverse sexuality is driven, power hungry, intense,
and selfish? I cannot accept this particular dichotomy. It leaves out too
much of what is infantile in sex-the reenactment of early feelings, the
boundlessness and omnipotence of infant desire and its furious gusto..
. For adults this totality, the total sexualization of everything, can only
be a fantasy. But does the fact that it cannot be actually lived mean this
fantasy must be discarded? It is a memory, a legitimate element in the
human lexicon of feelings.65
The definition and interpretation of infantile sexuality Snitow alludes to is
itself an assumption based on psychoanalytic constructs that are by no
means proven or true in any empirical sense. Snitow's essay illustrates
how persistent the paradigm of violence and power is in defining the erotic.
But her acceptance of the conflation of aggression, rage, and sexuality as
"natural" justifies the image of the erotic as a struggle for power rather
than a pursuit of pleasure-a justification that legitimates sexual abuse.
Dominance and submission eroticize power, power in the sense of
"power-over" another human being rather than the sense of liberating a
human's "power-to."66 This image of the eroticism of "power-over"
exists throughout culture. The bodice rippers, with women swept off their
feet or overpowered by passionate, if hard, men, construct an erotic
romance of dominance and submission. The visual media also participate
in romanticizing dominance and submission: Andrea Parrott has observed,
"Men overriding women's protests to win their adoration-even after
raping them-is a recurring theme in movies and television." 67 And many
women in this society see, and defend, as erotic the use of power,
domination, force, violence, and bondage. Recently, Sallie Tisdale wrote
in Harper's:
Power fantasies... are rather common for men and women both. I use
the term "power" to describe a huge continuum of images: physical and
psychological overpowering of many kinds, seduction and bondage and
65. Ann B. Snitow, Mass Market Romance: Pornography for Women Is Different, in PASSION AND
PowER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 259, 269 (Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989)(footnotes
omitted).
66. The terms "power-over" and "power-to" are explained in MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER:
ON WOMEN, MEN, AND MORALS 505 (1985) ("IThere are different sorts of power there is power-to,
which refers to ability, capacity and connotes a kind of freedom, and there is power-over, which refers to
domination. Both are highly esteemed in our society.").
67. Annie Nakao, Sex-Role Stereotypes Called a Cause of Date Rapes, S.F. EXAMINER, June 10,
1991, at Al, A15 (discussing society's perpetuation of sex-role stereotypes, including comments by Cornell
University's Andrea Parrott, author of Acquaintance Rape: The Hidden Crime).
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punishment, the extremes of physical control practiced by S&M
enthusiasts. The word "rape" for such scenes is inappropriate; the fact
of rape has nothing to do with sex, or pornography.68
Because rape is a crime of both sex and power, it is sexualized vio-
lence. 69 Accordingly, Tisdale's distinction is incoherent but telling: Sex
can include anything short of broken bones and blood, and sometimes
includes even those things.
Because the crime of rape as usually defined includes the elements of
force and nonconsent, the dominance and submission theme of "sex" often
justifies sexual violence. As Catharine MacKinnon observes, "[W]omen
consent to sex with force all the time." 70  The cultural images of
domination and force as erotic lead not only to the belief that "the legal
concept of consent can coexist with a lot of force," 7' but also to juror's
beliefs about what is sex and what is rape. Gary LaFree's work provides
a troubling example of this phenomenon: "In one consent [defense] case,
a black female juror noted that hospital records don't mean it was rape.
Abrasion of the vagina still doesn't mean rape-she might want that
force.'" 72 The dominance and submission story transforms the victim's
claim of rape into one of sex throughout the criminal justice system, and
makes men innocent and women guilty liars in many rape cases.
The dominance and submission story comports with the moral story
of male innocence and female guilt in another way. Women's passion and
lustfulness means that they are always already consenting; they are secretly
lust-filled creatures who want men to be forceful and to overcome their
false modesty. I once observed that Lord Byron's poetic phrase "[as she]
whisper[ed] 'I will ne'er consent'-consented," 73 had not altogether
negative connotations in this culture.74  Dominance and submission
support the cultural belief that no means yes and that men are entitled to
ignore and overcome women's objections. The belief is hardly new; in the
thirteenth century Albert the Great wrote:
As I heard in the confessional in Cologne, delicate wooers seduce
68. Sallie Tisdale, Talk Dirty to Me: A Woman's Taste for Pornography, HAPER's. Feb. 1992, at
37, 45.
69. Cf. Henderson, supra note 2, at 156-59 (discussing the problems of separating the definition of
rape into either a crime of violence or a crime of sex).
70. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1303
(1991).
71. Id; see also Estrich, supra note 57, at 1105-32 (1986) (describing appellate court interpretations
of consent and force that tolerate a great deal of violence against women).
72. LAF.it, supra note 39, at 218 (emphasis added).
73. GEORGE G. BYRON (LoR BYRON), DON JuAN: CANro I (1819), reprinted in TIlE NORTON
ATIHOLOGY OF ENouLsH LrrER rURE, at 1643 (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 1975).




women with careful touches. The more these women seem to reject
them, the more they really long for them and resolve to consent to them.
But in order to appear chaste, they act as if they disapprove of such
things.75
If no does not mean no, then the man is entitled to go ahead and override
the woman's express statement of her wishes, to dominate her, regardless
of what the woman actually says. A particular tragedy of the dominance
and submission and no means yes stories is not only that passivity means
acceptance, but also that women's assertiveness means acceptance. 76
It should be obvious that none of these defining stories is true in any
essential way. Despite the constant references to human nature to justify
the past and current paradigms of heterosexuality in the United States,
there is no credible evidence that our practices of dominance and submis-
sion or female guilt and male innocence are biologically inevitable or
necessary.. The practice of heterosexuality, like other human practices, is
variable and culturally scripted, which should give us hope. The story of
heterosexuality can and should be rewritten and reinterpreted as part of the
battle against rape. Rewriting that story is an urgent task for feminists, I
believe, for if we do not, the story will simply continue to reproduce itself
to the detriment of us all.
III. Rewriting The Stories
Rewriting the story of heterosexuality will be difficult because the
stories are so deeply entrenched in our culture. Further, Americans
become irrational on the subject of sex,' despite the prevalence of
implicit and explicit sex in the media and advertising. As a culture, we
may not know what healthy, nondominant, pleasurable, caring, and
responsible sex would look and feel like any more than someone who has
never known freedom from oppression would know what freedom looks
and feels like. We have few metaphors for sexual desire and passion that
are not also metaphors for violence, power, and irresponsibility. 78
Moreover, any attempt to develop a positive account of heterosexuality for
women in the context of compulsory heterosexuality 79 and patriarchal
75. RANKE-HEINEMANN, supra note 9, at 179 (discussing how Albert the Great, corrupted and
dehumanized by celibacy, readily slandered women to "further[] the monasticization of society").
76. Last year in a discussionwith Indiana University undergraduates, I heard of an undergraduate male
who proudly announced in a sociology class that he had a "three no rule." Fortunately his female
classmates did not react passively: milder responses included, "Do you tell your dates about this 'rule'?"
77. See D'EMio & F EEDMAN, supra note 13, at 359 ("Contemporary events [in America, including
the response to AIDS and outrage over the sex scandals of political leaders]... illustrate the continuing
power of sex as a symbol capable of arousing deep, irrational fears.").
78. See LAKOFF, supra note 33, at 412-15 (noting parallels in metaphors for anger and metaphors for
lust).
79. Adrienne Rich, Conpulsory Heterosulity and Lesbian Edstence in POWERS OF DESIR THE
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society may be dangerous, because of the dangers of reinforcing
heterosexism. 8° Although it will be a great challenge, for the many
women who do not choose celibacy and do not want or enjoy lesbian
sexual experiences, I think it is crucial to examine which heterosexual
practices and attitudes hurt women and which heterosexual practices and
attitudes give them pleasure.
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin have offered one new
version of the story of heterosexuality. But, although we owe much to
MacKinnon and Dworkin for their theoretical and practical contributions
to the effort to end sexual use and abuse of women, their story of
heterosexuality is a reductionist one of female innocence or complicity and
male guilt. Dworkin argues that women who voluntarily engage in
heterosexual activity collaborate with or manipulate men; they do not
experience pleasure, they experience pain and splitting in intercourse.81
While Dworkin's polemic against intercourse does capture one part of
women's experiences, I also read the book as full of shame and hatred of
the female body as well as a denial of women's heterosexual agency and
pleasure. 82 And although MacKinnon does not deny that glimpses of
equality and heterosexual pleasure are possible, she has asserted that
"[p]erhaps the wrong of rape has proved so difficult to define because the
unquestionable starting point has been that rape is defined as distinct from
intercourse, while for women it is difficult to distinguish the two under
conditions of male dominance."83 MacKinnon's denigration of women's
ability to tell the difference between sex and rape leaves the current
structures of heterosexuality unchallenged, unmodified, untouched.
The Dworkin and MacKinnon stories negate women's expressed
wishes and experiences and ironically reinforce women's lack of control
in heterosexual relations. This denial of agency parallels the stories of
male innocence and female guilt, male dominance and female submission,
and penetration as the criterion of sexual pleasure, allowing for continued
tolerance of heterosexual violence. Thus, while MacKinnon and Dworkin
have made an invaluable contribution to the dialogue, they have not helped
POLITICS OF SExCUALIrY 177, 178-82 (Ann B. Snitow et al. eds., 1983) (suggesting that male-identified
society has created political institutions that compel women into heterosexuality by portraying lesbian
experience "on a scale ranging from deviant to abhorrent, or simply rendered invisiblo").
80. See, e.g., aELL HOOKS, FEMINIsTTHEoRY: FROM MARGINTO CENTEI 147-56 (1984) (discussing
the disruptive tendency throughout the feminist movement "to make the struggle to end sexual oppression
a competition" between heterosexuality and lesbianism).
81. ANDREA DwoRrIN, INTERCOURSE 121-43 (1987) (arguing that the objectification of women that
occurs in heterosexual intercourse makes heterosexual equality and pleasure impossible).
82. This may be a somewhat idiosyncratic reading; however, the book contains repeated negative
images and loathing of the female body that are not challenged directly by the author. There is no
celebration of women's physiology that I can find, at least. See, e.g., Id. at 169-72 (accepting ascription
of dirtiness to females without contradiction).
83. MAcKINNON, supra note 55, at 174.
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women to define or explain any of the pleasure women might experience
in heterosexual activity. To break out of the cage of guilt and submission,
we need alternative stories that place women's experiences of
heterosexuality in the center.
If we are to rewrite the story of heterosexuality, then we must listen
to women's voices telling about their experiences. Lois Pineau has
suggested that we look at heterosexual interactions from the woman's point
of view, not the man's, and take seriously the woman's account of pleasure
as well as pain.84  Doing so should help to develop a cultural
understanding that women are not always filled with lust, that sadomasoch-
istic sexual practices as the norm of heterosexuality are damaging and
painful to women, and that present definitions of rape ignore both
women's human dignity and their sexual agency. 85 In order to develop
an understanding of rape from a woman's perspective, a woman's story of
the difference between heterosexual intercourse and rape must be heard.
While some writers have posited a continuum between rape and
heterosexual intercourse, 6 none to my knowledge has attempted to
describe what the continuum between rape and pleasurable heterosexuality
might be. In this section, I present a tentative description of the
continuum, using experiential accounts as a guide to that description.8 7
In devising my descriptions, I have been guided by my own experiences as
a rape survivor with a heterosexual identity, conversations with numerous
other women, most of whom are white, and the writings of other feminist
legal scholars. I have also borrowed from Sam Keen's men's movement
best-seller, Fire in the Belly,88 because it contains a description of
heterosexuality that resonates with what my friends and I have experienced
and discussed.
In formulating my descriptions of women's sexual experiences, I want
to emphasize that I am making no claim to being an authority on the
subject. Nor am I claiming anything "essential" about female sexuality,
existing separate and apart from context and culture. Sex cannot be
separated from context; heterosexual activity in this culture does take place
84. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 236-40 (1989).
85. I agree with Robin West's argument that the law cannot take women seriously until they speak
of their pain and pleasure. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenonuenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WoMEN's L.J. 81, 144-45 (1987) (arguing
that we need to listen to women's accounts of pain and pleasure in order to develop legal tools to combat
pain and enhance pleasure).
86. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 74, at 226-27 (suggesting a phenomenological difference between
rape and lovemaking); Lynne Henderson, Law's Patriarchy, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 411, 432-33 (1991)
(criticizing Carol Smart for claiming there is a "continuum between (hetero)sex and rape" without
explaining what it might be in CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 44 (1989)).
87. See Appendix A for a visual depiction of the continuum.
88. SAM KEEN, FIRE IN THE BELLY: ON BEING A mN 489 (1991).
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in a context of compulsory heterosexuality, widespread sexual abuse of
females, and persistent gender inequalities. It is also true that a language
of women's sexuality is not readily available, as sexuality remains
described from a male point of view, using male words and metaphors.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that female heterosexual experience
cannot be described at all, or that women should continue to cede the
description of heterosexuality to a masculine point of view. The challenge
is to identify and express those elements of heterosexuality that are
pleasurable, to separate those experiences from the ones that are painful,
and to decide which of the painful experiences are rape and criminal.
If one listens to women's .experiences, it becomes apparent that
heterosexual women do not always feel harmed by heterosexual penetra-
tion; they may indeed find it desirable and pleasurable in certain contexts.
Many women also know that it is rape when they are ignored by a man
who does not care about their wishes and forces his penis into them. It is
painful, scary, degrading, and damaging. Thus, we see the beginnings of
the continuum: at one end, pleasurable heterosexual sex, at the other end,
rape. Between the two situations are encounters which are sometimes
"rape" and sometimes "sex."
The continuum includes the experience of what Robin West has
identified as the problem of the "giving self" and the experience that I will
refer to here as "bad sex." 89  West describes an experience somewhere
between rape and "bad sex" where women transform a threatening and
scary heterosexual encounter into consensual sexual intercourse or contact
by becoming "giving selves" who consent in order to diffuse the
danger.9' The woman is frightened subjectively, although she may not
be able to specify any behavior on the part of the man that frightened her.
Rather, it can be a generalized fear of male violence, a "look," an attitude,
that leads her to believe that she can diffuse the physical danger she
perceives by "giving him what he wants." In this situation, differentiating
between rape and intercourse might be the most difficult and would
approach MacKinnon's description. 91  Contrary to Lois Pineau's
argument that it is unreasonable to think that women would consent to
something that is not pleasurable for them, 92 the giving self consents in
89. See West, supra note 85, at 103 (describing a "giving self" as a woman who consents to sex, not
to satiate her own desires, but to satiate the desires and pleasure of the other). "Bad sex" is hardly an
original term-it is used in ordinary discourse among lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and heterosexuals.
90. See id. at 101-06 (reviewing various accounts of the relationship between fear of violence and
sexual consent).
91. See MAcKINNON, supra note 55, at 174 (arguing that it is difficult for women to distinguish the
difference between rape and intercourse because they are constantly subjected to male domination).
92. Pineau, supra note 84, at 232 ("[l]f science and the voice of women concur, if aggressive
seduction does not lead to good sex, if women do not like it or want it, then it is not rational to think that
they would agree to it. Where such sex takes place, it is therefore rational to presume that the sex was
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order to avoid danger, a choice that may very well be "rational" under the
circumstances.93 She may have preempted a legal claim of rape, because
she consented, but the giving self may be aware that whatever the
encounter was, it was frightening, upsetting, and invasive. Alternatively,
the encounter might have been deadening and self-denying. Such
"consensual" sex for the giving self, although both rational and involving
the exercise of some minimum of "choice" or agency on the part of the
woman, is not a pleasurable experience. This sex is closer to rape than to
pleasurable sex along the continuum between the two.
"Bad sex" for women is intercourse that was not particularly
pleasurable but was not scary, or deadening, or shaming. Despite the
common joke that women who say they were raped are only complaining
about bad sex, in the various situations that constitute bad sex, the partners
know they could stop things or change their minds without fearing that the
other person would assault them.' The experience of bad sex actually
ranges from the not-so-good to the truly rotten, but it does not involve
abuse in the sense of the dehumanization of the woman or the experience
of fear. Bad sex can range from the experience of disappointment when one
hoped the man would be a better lover, to the experience of being
distracted or losing desire during the course of events, to being bored, to
feeling disappointed because one did not feel the pleasure one had hoped
to at a particular time. A woman may have made a decision to engage in
heterosexual intercourse that she regrets because it did not provide
pleasure, or that she feels was a mistake. Or bad sex can be a disaster,
where one's state of being or one's partner's state of being is such that
there is an utter failure to have pleasure in the interaction. If one is
preoccupied with a problem, the mechanics may work but the experience,
while not painful, is not pleasurable either. Yet women who have
experienced bad sex do not feel raped, because they were exercising some
agency, and their partner did not abuse them, ignore them, or deny their
humanity. They were not used as objects for the acting out of power or
anger or sadism.95 Bad sex is not particularly pleasant, perhaps, but,
unlike rape, it does not damage a woman's personality, sense of self, sense
of safety in the world, or overall well-being. Bad sex falls somewhere
between the giving self and pleasurable sex on the continuum between rape
and heterosexual sex.
not consensual.").
93. See West, supra note 85, at 102 ("A straightforward, sensible, protective reaction to someone who
is indifferent to your subjectivity, and at the same time must have you as an object, is to hide your
subjective self and objectivity and then to give your sexual self for his pleasure and your safety.").
94. 1 am grateful to Robin West for helping me with this point.
95. See generally A. NICHOLAS GRorT & H. JEAN ButAuM, MEN WHO RAPE 13 (1979) (suggesting
that there are three forms of rape: anger rape, power rape, and sadistic rape).
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The next step along the continuum involves distinguishing bad sex
from something pleasurable and something of value to women, even within
the context of inequalities in a male-dominated society. Drucilla Cornell
made an important contribution to understanding what pleasurable hetero-
sexuality might be. Cornell's efforts to describe the pleasure and positivity
in sexual receptivity and intimacy as something other than sexual
degradation suggest a feminine understanding of sexuality and desire that
escapes hierarchy and celebrates human connection. 96 But her efforts are
hampered by ceding, with some of the French feminists, the definition and
realm of sexual description to male language.97 I do not think, however,
that female sexual experiences need to be confined to the realm of the
unspeakable or metaphysical even though I agree with Cornell that for now
we may have to be metaphorical in describing good sex. 98
Many women feel heterosexual desire. They want to, and do, act
upon it and experience great pleasure. Heterosexual desire, touching,
connection with another person who is male can feel good; it can be
pleasurable; it can be happy and enjoyable for women. Intimacy here
means more than what one body part is doing with another. It is closer to
the "I-Thou" experience of permeable boundaries with simultaneous
recognition of another living being,99 together with all sorts of riffs of
physical, bodily pleasure from head to toe. Good sex can be crazy, silly,
sweaty, passionate, intense, languid, loving, orgasmic, enlivening,
96. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTON,
AND THE LAw 130-64 (1991) (arguing that sex can be a receptive and connecting act rather than accepting
Catharine MacKinnon's idea as interpreted by Cornell that sex results in the body becoming a "barrier in
which the self hides and [eitherl guards itself" or asserts itself against others).
97. Id. at 147-52 (arguing that rather than reject metaphors that have been used to misdefine women,
feminists should adopt a methodology of circling within the metaphors of the feminine); see also id. at 156
("Feminine style is this constant experimentation to write the unspeakable, knowing all the while the
inherent contradiction in the effort.. . . We can never know for sure that we have come out of their
language."); Arleen B. Dallety, The Politics of Writing the Body: Ecriture Fihnhe, in
GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEOE 52, 54 (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989) ("French feminism,
criturefieminine [(writing the body)], essentially deconstructs the phallic organization of sexuality and its
code, which positions woman's sexuality and signified body as a mirror or complement to male sexual
identity."); Luce Irigaray, The Ser Which is Not One, in NEw FREN H FENIINIsMS 99, 106 (Elaine Marks
& Isabelle Courtivron eds., 1981) (arguing that while women should take certain steps "in their effort to
escape their proletarization on the trade market," it is impossible for them to reverse the existing order of
domination without a "return to phallocratism, where neither women's sex, their imaginary, nor their
language can exist"); Xavir Gauthier, Is There Such a Tdng as Women's Writing?, in id. at 161, 162
(noting that men and women "speak approximately the same language,- one that is based "upon one
fundamental signifier, the phallus").
98. CORNELL, supra note 96, at 203-05 (asserting that rather than reject the metaphors that have been
used to define women, feminists should adopt a methodology of using the metaphors of the feminine to
create and give value to the feminine).
99. In "I-Thou" relations, the "I" (self) knows itself as known and is active. "I-Thou" relations stand
in contrast to "I-It" relations, in which I is not a reflective being and does not know itself as being known.
H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 72-73 (1963) (discussing Martin Buber's existentialist




The cultural conflation of sexual pleasure and orgasm is insufficient
to capture the experience of good sex. Orgasm is not a goal, an achieve-
ment, but a part of a process; orgasm is not necessary to having a
pleasurable sexual encounter. Further, because orgasm can happen even
in a violent rape, orgasm alone cannot define good sex. Nor is penile
penetration, the model of heterosexual expression as reflected in the letter
to Ann Landers discussed in Part I,100 necessary in good sex. As
Cornell and others have written, female sexuality is complex and multi-
faceted, and women may be stimulated at multiple sites in and on the body,
with and through the emotions. 10 1 Yet, although vaginal penetration is
not the central part of sexual pleasure for women, it certainly can be a part
of pleasure, and on this I agree with Cornell's characterization of
connection and intimacy with another as part of the pleasure.102 In an
atmosphere of trust, care and desire, heterosexual activity, including inter-
course, is an experience of intimacy, not invasion; connection, not
intrusion. Rather than being deadening, good sex can be enlivening and
amazing.
Lois Pineau posits a somewhat less physical vision of sexuality, one
that honors women's wants, desires, and voices. Pineau terms this
"communicative sexuality," or heterosexuality modeled on friendship. 10 3
In friendship and sexuality, she suggests, both people operate in a context
of sympathy or empathy, care, and concern for the other person's feelings
and desires. 104 If we do not understand one another's communication,
we ask and we strive to work together to understand one another. We take
responsibility for the other's feelings and well-being in friendship and
should do so as well in sexuality. Like Pineau, I think, although I do not
know, that female sexual pleasure is most likely to occur in the context of
a relationship of mutual care, communication, desire, and attention.
Certainly it is not simply a matter of which button is pushed when or
which bodily part is manipulated in what way, which is the thesis of so
many American sex manuals. Rather, it is self and other, working and
playing together.
Sam Keen presents another vision of women's sexuality that challenges
100. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
101. See CORNEU., supra note 96, at 156-64 (surveying the descriptions of female sexuality written
by Luce Irigaray, Hdl~ne Cixous, and Monique Wittig).
102. See &. at 154.
103. Pineau, supra note 84, at 233-37.
104. See id. at 236 ("Intuition will help them to interpret their partner's response; sympathy will
enable them to share what their partner is feeling; charity will enable them to eare."). I think Pineau uses
"sympathy" to mean what is more appropriately designated "empathy." See Lynne Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1574, 1579-82 (1987) (discussing the linguistic origins, definition, and
literary connotations of "empathy").
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existing male understandings of what sex properly is and reflects conversa-
tions and feelings I have had as well:
I have it on good authority that when women get together and talk about
their lovers they don't speak much about hardness, speed or numbers of
orgasms. Instead they praise men who touch softly, who receive
pleasure as easily as they give it, who are as comfortable melting into
the softness of communion as in thrusting vigorously in the frenzy of
climax. My informal poll of women of all political persuasions reveals
that they all agree that they would like men to slow down, take their
time, enjoy the trip and not worry so much about the outcome ...
Almost without exception my informants say that women keep trying to
degenitalize men's focus and teach them that there are only two
erogenous zones-the heart and the skin.105
This image, -along with the other images of enjoyable heterosexual
intimacy, is helpful, at least for me, in developing a description of the
pleasurable sex end of the continuum.
Given such accounts of heterosexual pleasure, what of the disconcert-
ing fact that women report sexual arousal and pleasure in sadomasochistic
texts such as Story of ?106  Or that women find pleasure in being
overpowered? Undeniably, millions of women read bodice rippers for
pleasure. Robin West, in a thoughtful analysis of women's seemingly
paradoxical reactions to Story of 0, suggests that dominance and
submission may be erotic for women in an atmosphere of trust and
care. 10 7 Sallie Tisdale, in her defense of pornography, writes that the
appeal of pornography involving power and objectification frees the woman
from sexual shame, and that the woman wants to be free of shame, guilt,
and responsibility. 108  In a culture that makes women's sexuality
shameful and dirty, in a culture that condemns women as the source of
sexual immorality, through a story that places all guilt in the female, it is
small wonder that she should seek that freedom. And in a telling conclu-
sion to her celebration of sexual abandonment, Tisdale wrote, "I could not
read such stories, watch such films, with anyone but a lover. I couldn't
act them out except with the person whom I trusted most of all." 10 9
While I do not find domination and submission erotic-Story of 0
horrifies me-I believe that within a context of trust and care it would be
possible for heterosexual couples to experiment and to play out fantasies
105. Kt:"z, supra note 88, at 489. Whether his authority is accurate in some technical social-scientific
or scientific point of view is less interesting to me than his respectful description of the female-focused
perception of what is pleasurable to women and what is not.
106. PAULINE RPAAGE, STORY OF 0 (Sabine d'Estr&e trans., Ballantine Books 1973) (1954).
107. West, supra note 85, at 129-33.




of domination and submission in a way that is not damaging. With
empathy and trust, heterosexual couples perhaps can experience the kind
of doubling that gay and lesbian couples describe in the experience of
acting out dominance and submission. 110 Such doubling does not simply
recreate and reinforce existing hierarchies of gender, but produces a both-
and experience, perhaps subverting gender hierarchy.111  But the
heterosexual couple might find entrenched gender roles and sheer physical
inability to empathize a difficult barrier to cross in order to achieve
doubling and rebellion in this way.' 12  At least arguably, resistance and
doubling take place within a context of willingness and empathy; each
person has a choice and there is no denial of the other person's humanity
and feelings. If this is possible for heterosexuals, then it provides a
challenge to existing stories and practices.
From this tentative description of sexual pleasure and pain we may
conclude that women experience pleasure in heterosexual practices in ways
far different from those embodied in the male innocence-female guilt and
dominance-submission stories as understood in this culture. If it is the case
that women do not take pleasure in being obliterated, that they do not take
pleasure in being ignored, used and frightened by men, then when men do
these things, they are guilty of sexual abuse. The sooner we start
emphasizing this, the better.
IV. The Role Of Law
Feminists, together with crime control conservatives and sympathetic
men, achieved a number of important reforms in the law of rape starting
in the 1970s. 113  In response to the rape-as-violence argument, many
states redefined rape to be forcible intercourse, dropping any explicit
nonconsent requirement; other states dropped the force requirement and
110. See SIMON WATNEY, POLCING DEsIRE PORNOGRAPHY, AIDS, AND THE MEDIA 28 (2nd ed.
1989) (arguing that since homosexuals can play both the dominant (i.e. "penetrator") and the submissive
(i.e. none who is penetrated") roles in their relationships, they are able to exercise these roles without
being damaged by the violence and hatred which can result from these sexual categories).
111. See Carl F. Stychin, Explaring the Limits: Feninism and the Legal Regulation of Gay Male
Pornography, 16 VT. L. REv. 857, 878-79 n.51 (1992) ("Gay male pornography, particularly, has the
ability to destabilize the signifier. The ability of gay men to assume both dominant and submissive roles
establishes fantasy as open and 'boundaryless'....").
112. In Rape and Responsibility, I note that men might not be able physically to empathize with the
violence and pain in forcible penetration, because they do not have vaginas. See Henderson, supra note
2, at 157-58. Because women do not have testes or penises, they may not be able to empathize with the
pain that too much force or pressure can cause those bodily parts. Although there are analogues-the
clitoris for women, the nipples for men-I, at least, have found it tricky to know if I am causing my
partner discomfort unless he tells me.
113. See, e.g., MARSH Er AL., supra note 45, at 11 (describing the passage of the model rape reform
law in Michigan in 1974 by a bipartisan coalition of women and law-and-order advocates).
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made nonconsensual intercourse a crime. 114 Many of these reforms were
directed toward reducing bias against rape survivors. 115 None of the
statutes to my knowledge adopted a woman-focused view of rape, however.
Force remained defined on male terms and so did consent. 116 Few, if
any, of the reforms directly addressed the problem of the myth of male
innocence or challenged the male image of what constitutes noncriminal
heterosexual behavior. 117  Because these stories form the filter through
which any given rape case is interpreted, any additional law reform should
be directed at undermining these cultural myths.
Currently, understandings of what constitutes sex and what constitutes
rape assume that women find pleasure in what is painful and, as MacKin-
non says, consent to sadomasochistic sexual practices all the time. 118 A
diagram illustrating the continuum in beliefs about what is rape and what
is sex in this culture follows this Article. 119 Along the continuum from
sex to rape, acts that involve intercourse in the context of actual violence,
visible injury, threats, implied violence, and sheer overbearing of women
are often believed to be sex and not rape. What might charitably be
termed confusion over what rape is results from the belief that women are
guilty in sexual encounters and that dominance and submission is the
paradigmatic context for heterosexuality.120
While I am not concerned with defending the argument here, I do
think that rape is best defined in terms of nonconsent. Courts in
jurisdictions that have a force requirement continue to require force beyond
the overbearing of a woman who says no. A Pennsylvania appellate court
114. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autononry Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond. II
LAW & PHIL. 35, 39 (1992) (noting that Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(f)(1991) has at elaborate
definition of force, while Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402,406 (1990) has made nonconseot the central element
in rape by defining nonconsent as an expression by the victim of "lack of consent through words or
conduct").
115. See MARSH ZIP AL., supra note 45, at 3 ("[Elfforts [at reform] are part of a larger statement that,
as women move into more autonomous roles in society, their activities deserve to be acknowledged and
respected.").
116. See Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 64 (arguing that force has remained at the forefront of the
definition of rape while consent has been deemed less important as a result of our social structure and
concrete male interests in preservation of the male prerogative).
117. See id. at 41 (describing feminists' concern that force and consent reflect male viewpoints and
that new standards need to incorporate female ideas about force, which can include nonphysial
intimidation, in order to fully capture what rape is); Henderson, supra note 2, at 156-59 (explaining how
the rape as violence argument allows men who rape to claim innocence because in labeling rape as
"violence" "feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what they have done front what rapists do [due
to the fact that] they haven't caused external physical damage that they can understand as violence").
118. MacKinnon, supra note 70, at 1303.
119. Appendix A.
120. But see Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 77 ("In sum, intercourse in the face of verbal objections,
ambivalence, or silence is intercourse without consent, and it represents a clear offense against the personal
autonomy of the person. Even in the complete absence of force, such behavior is 'nonviolent sexual
misconduct' and should be punished as such."). But see infra text accompanying note 121.
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recently held that although the victim "had continually said 'no' during the
incident [sic]," because "there was no evidence that she was prevented
from leaving the room," there was no "forcible compulsion," and therefore
no proof of rape. 121 The requirement of additional force assumes that
lack-of-consent intercourse itself does not constitute force and pain, which
utterly ignores women's experiences, As I have noted elsewhere,"it should
go without saying that if a woman does not want to engage in intercourse
and is not consenting, the man has to" use physical force to accomplish the
act.' 22 And a man's forcing his penis into a woman's body can be
excruciatingly painful. The harm is in the invasion and the denial of one's
existence as a human being, not whether or not there is additional violence.
Thus, I agree with a number of authors who have, using various perspec-
tives, concluded that the harm in rape is nonconsensual intercourse or
sexual abuse and that requiring some form of violence in addition
perpetuates a male, rather than a female, interpretation of rape law.
123
Yet against the background of the stories we tell about heterosexuality,
"consent" becomes the legal justification for finding that the man is not
guilty of rape in a number of contexts. Even in states in which the
statutory elements of rape no longer explicitly include language requiring
lack of consent, consent remains an issue.124 And in those jurisdictions
that require the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew the victim
was not consenting, 125 our stories of male innocence-female guilt, male
aggression-female passivity make it almost impossible to prove the
defendant had the requisite mens rea, especially where there is no weapon
or additional violence. If the woman says no, the male innocence story
holds that she does not really mean no, and thus juries can easily find that
the defendant was reasonable in believing that the victim was consenting.
Similarly, if the legally required mens rea as to nonconsent is
recklessness, 126  a defendant can successfully argue that he never
121. State v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1347-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); see also Wherein 'No' Is
Not Enough, N.Y.TMEs, May 29, 1992, at Bll.
122. Henderson, supra note 2, at 158.
123. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 57, at 1103-15 (criticizing the legal understanding of force as male
defined and arguing that law should not presume consent); cf. Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 36 (criticizing
the force requirement and proposing that noneonsensual intercourse be criminal, although not rape).
124. See, e.g., ES'nuCtt, supra note 5, at 84-85 (describing a Michigan court's holding that a jury
should be instructed that consent is a full defense under a rape statute drafted to preclude such a defense
"under circumstances involving commission of a felony").
125. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §35-42-4-1 (Burns 1992) (defining rape as:"A person who knowingly
or intentionally has sexual intercourse... when: (1) The other person is compelled by force or imminent
threat of force"). This statute can be read to require knowledge as to compulsion, which, in turn, means
without consent.
126. See, e.g., State v. Koonee, 731 S.W.2d431, 437 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("Rape and sodomy
can be committed 'recklessly'. . . [when the act isi done with an awareness of the risk and a conscious
disregard of that risk.').
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"consciously disregarded" the risk of nonconsent. Negligence, the least
exacting mens rea requirement, does not really change this basic pattern.
If a man has an honest and reasonable belief in consent from the male point
of view, he is not guilty. 12 7 As a male Dartmouth student reportedly
said, "There's a social dance that goes on. Passivity you read as
acceptance rather than denial."128  Thus, if it is reasonable to believe no
means yes, if it is reasonable to believe that female passivity is normal and
natural, then the man lacks the mens rea for rape.
The time framing' 29 on consent also creates a cruel double bind for
women. If the reasonable man, like the author of the letter to Ann
Landers, 130 believes that as soon as the woman does anything to arouse
him she is consenting to intercourse, then arguably any sexualized
interaction is consent to intercourse. If male arousal is such that it
demands satisfaction, setting into action an unstoppable chain of events, a
woman's right to say no quickly disappears. On the other hand, even if a
woman does say no early in the encounter, if she is not resisting and
struggling late in the events, she is consenting. Thus, regardless of how
she reacts, a jury could well find that she had consented to the act,
transforming rape into sex.
A recent, and shocking, example of the themes of male innocence and
female guilt, male dominance and female submission, and of misunder-
standings about what constitutes consent comes from a grand jury's failure
to indict a man for rape in Austin, Texas. 131 The man entered his
victim's home and hid in her bathroom. Returning from a party at 3 a.m.,
the victim had gone to bed. The victim said her dog began barking, and
she got out of bed to see why the dog was barking. She saw the man,
whom she did not know, in the hall. She latched her bedroom door, and
"tried to call 911. " 132 At that point, the woman stated, he broke into
her bedroom armed with a knife, and raped her at knife point. During the
course of the sexual assault, the victim asked her assailant to wear a
127. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337. 1345 (Cal. 1975) (holding that defendant is
entitled to an instruction on whether he entertained a reasonable and bona ide belief as to consent under
California law).
128. Philip Weiss, The Second Revolution, HARPER's, Apr. 1991, at 58, 72 (criticizing one
university's efforts to protect undergraduate women).
129. This phrase comes from Mark Kelman's superb critique of criminal law doctrine. See Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591. 600-616 (1981)
(defining the narrow time frame as beginning at the moment the person decides to commit the criminal
offense, defining the broad time frame as accounting for events both prior and subsequent to the criminal
incident, and arguing that the narrow time frame view of consent serves a vital ideological function for free
markets-while "produc[ing] rather trivial criminal law results").
130. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
131. The following facts comes from Kimberly Garcia, Grand Jury Decides Not to Indict on Rape
Charge, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Oct. 9. 1992, at Al, A8.
132. Id. at A8.
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condom that she provided to protect herself from AIDS and other
infections. Subsequently, the man confessed, but said, "'Where was no
rape to it. She's the one who gave me the condoms. If she didn't want to,
why would she give me the condoms?'" 133 While these facts seem to fit
the classic stereotype of rape-a stranger with a weapon breaking into
one's home-the grand jury disagreed.
Given these facts, it appears to be outrageous that the grand jury did
not indict the man. 134 The failure is less outrageous if one subscribes
to the stories of male innocence or dominance and submission, however.
The interpretation of the facts then becomes one of her blameworthiness
and sexual proclivities. She was to blame because she was sexually active
(she had condoms) and was out late at a party. Using a narrow time
frame, despite the fact he was armed, she had to be consenting because she
asked him to wear a condom that she provided him. Alternatively, the
story could be one of her sexual "kinkiness" and women's desire to be
overpowered: She liked having sexual intercourse with strangers holding
knives.
In an unusual, although legal, move, the prosecution sought an
indictment before a second grand jury. The second grand jury did indict
the man for rape, but he continues to assert that she consented. 135
Such horror stories, together with existing interpretations of consent
and mens rea, demonstrate that the male innocence and dominance and
submission stories of heterosexuality must be challenged. I believe that the
way to ensure women's sexual safety in this society is to place an
affirmative burden on men to assure that their partners are consenting.
One way to accomplish this would be to change the mens rea requirement
for consent in a way that displaces the myths of male innocence and female
guilt, dominance and submission. First, the minimum culpable mens rea
as to consent should be negligence, as Susan Estrich has argued. 136 But,
as I have argued elsewhere, simply using the reasonable man, or the
reasonable man in the defendant's circumstances, standard is not enough
to displace the presumption that women are always and already consenting,
lustful creatures, nor does it counteract images of male persistence and
133. Id.
134. One could blame the prosecution, the grand jury, or both for this failure, but whether it was lack
of prosecutorial interest or poor judgment on the part of the jurors is difficult to know. The prosecution
did not have the victim testify before the grand jury, apparently because the prosecution thought it had a
"clear cut case." See id. at Al (discussing the facts surrounding the decision not to indict). It may also
be true that the prosecution did not take the case seriously because of beliefs about the victim and rape.
There are at least some who assert that the prosecution did not take the case seriously until the media
brought the matter to public attention. Id. at AS.
135. Jim Phillips and Kimberly Garcia, Grand Jury Indicts Man in Condom Rape Case, AUsTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al, A6.
136. See EsmRCH, supra note 5, at 96-98; Estrich, supra note 57, at 1182-83.
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dominance. 137  Thus, I would argue that the law impose strict liability
as soon as the woman says no or indicates that she does not want to engage
in sexual activity. This essentially creates a conclusive presumption of
recklessness.138 Once the man is told no, he is alerted to the risk of lack
of consent and should bear the risk if he continues despite the no. No
should mean no. Stop should mean stop. Crying should negate consent.
Similarly, screaming and silence are negations. Further, a woman's lack
of positive cooperation in sexual activity is a signal of nonconsent, 139 not
her "natural" passivity. If the man is under the influence, it should not
negate his mens rea; many jurisdictions already presume recklessness as
mens rea when the defendant is voluntarily intoxicated, 140  and the
presumption should be equally applicable to culpability for rape.
I believe imposing a conclusive presumption of recklessness in such
instances would cover the so-called "ambiguous" situation, in which the
man claims he had "mixed signals" or that the woman seemed to be "going
along" because she was not actively resisting. If a man is receiving
"mixed signals," he is on notice to ascertain whether his partner is willing
to continue, and if he does not stop and clarify things, he is reckless. But
even if the presumption does not work in the ambiguous case, the benefits
of this presumption are several. First, it displaces focus from the male
standard as to what constitutes consent and what does not. Second, a
conclusive presumption would at least make those instances in which there
were threats or where a woman's refusal to consent was ignored easier to
prosecute. Third, a presumption of recklessness when a man is on notice
that the woman does not want to have intercourse (or oral or anal sex)
speaks to the specific event at the specific time more than the current
practice does. While it may be true that the victim's credibility can still
be attacked with prior acts of consent, in the instance of an acquaintance
rape it is less relevant that she consented in the past if she said no at the
time in question, because what he believed or presumed would be
137. Henderson, supra note 74, at 217-18.
138. Susan Estrich comes close to this when she argues that reasonable men should be held to a no
means no standard, but refuses to argue for a conclusive presumption of recklessness and is unclear on
negligence. See Estrich, supra note 57, at 1104.
139. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 1992) (defining consent as "positive
cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (Wcst
Supp. 1992) (defining consent as "words or overt actions ... indicating freely given agreement").
140. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302, 1308 (N.J. 1986) (holding that evidence of
voluntary intoxication should be excluded when crimes require mental states of only recklessness or
negligence); People v. Guillet, 69 N.W. 2d 140, 143 (Mich. 1955) (holding that intoxication may only
negate specific intent); MODEL PENAL CODE §2.08(2) (1980) (establishing that if an actor is unaware of
risk due to self-induced intoxication, and that actor would have been aware of risk if sober, the actor's lack
of awareness is immaterial); cf. State v. Vaughan, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1977) (adopting what the
court classified as the minority rule that "voluntary intoxication, where it has not produced pernanent
insanity, is never ... a defense to crime, regardless" of whether intent is general or specific).
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irrelevant to his being on notice at the time of the interaction that led him
to rape. Of course, the woman's credibility as to whether she signalled no
in such a way as to put the man on notice still can be attacked in a number
of ways-by innuendo if nothing else-but at least the law would not be
telling the jury that it does not matter if she said no, or cried, or froze in
terror. Finally, a conclusive presumption really does give women some
power to determine whether or not they wish to engage in heterosexual
activity. At present, if their voices can be ignored, if their silence can be
ignored, by men and by the law, it makes no sense for women to take any
affirmative responsibility in sexual encounters. And if this is the case, then
the old no-means-yes, just-overpower-me model of heterosexuality remains
firmly in place in law and in fact.
I am not optimistic that legislatures would enact such a conclusive
presumption in the near future. First, assigning the risk of being wrong
to men rather than women through a form of strict liability significantly
challenges the liberal legalist understanding of criminal law that requires
that a person be morally blameworthy. 141 Because of the assumptions
that men cannot stop once they get to a certain point, that they are entitled
to sex, and that women ask for it, imposing strict liability on men for
raping women seems to punish them for unavoidable, and therefore not
blameworthy, conduct. But this is simply not the case if one realizes that
there is nothing about arousal that necessitates penetration. Another
possible liberal objection is that a conclusive presumption of recklessness
would relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving a serious offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, but such an objection would be inapposite: the
prosecution would still have to prove that the victim indicated lack of
consent beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the presumption to apply.
Finally, punishments for rape are fairly high in most jurisdictions. Liberal
legal legislatures, and sympathetic scholars including Susan Estrich, 142
are likely to be reluctant to punish the negligent or presumptively reckless
man as severely as a stereotypical rapist, because somehow they are not as
"culpable." 143 Thus, unless the punishment for rape were reduced in
exchange, a conclusive presumption might not be enacted.
Strict liability for lack of consent would probably meet with severe
opposition from crime control and conservative thinkers as well. Despite
many conservatives' fondness for strict liability for some violations,
141. See Kelman, supra note 129, at 610-11 (observing that most resist the idea of punishing people
who are without fault).
142. See EsmcHti, supra note 5, at 96-104 (noting that if negligence liability is imposed on men for
rapes, traditional views of male aggression and conduct must be changed or men will be punished for
behavior that they do not recognize as criminal).
143. I discuss this issue of punishment in Rape and Responsibility. See Henderson, supra note 2, at
174-76.
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including those of drug laws and felony murder, they are likely to balk at
a reform that challenges the male innocence-female guilt story of
heterosexuality in such an explicit way. Empowering women is not on the
agenda of many conservatives. While crime control advocates have
supported some rape reform laws, some legislators have resisted repeal of
the marital rape exemption in many states as well as reforms that expand
the definition of rape beyond its classic formulation. 44 Conservative
resistance to the formulation "no means no" and to woman-centered
interpretations of rape would undoubtedly thwart additional reform
challenging "traditional values" and woman-blaming. Further, the
retaliatory and retributive rationales for punishment many subscribe to
would not exist because they will not feel the kind of visceral moral
outrage toward a man who "simply" rapes a woman, if for no other reason
than they are likely to subscribe to the male innocence belief system.
Even if legislatures made further revisions in the law of rape or sexual
assault to formally change the law on the books, it might not make much
difference in successful criminal prosecutions, at least in the short term.
As Susan Estrich recently noted, pushing the boundaries of rape law in
acquaintance rape cases over the past few years may have created a kind
of judicial and professional legal backlash against rape shield statutes and
other reforms. 145 I have argued that juries and undoubtedly prosecutors
will be reluctant to convict men of rape in all but the most stereotypical
instances as long as the male innocence-female guilt model applies. 146
As the Pennsylvania case mentioned above indicates, 47 many appellate
courts are still not willing to interpret rape and sexual abuse statutes
outside of a male-defined view of force and sex. And as long as many
subscribe to Camille Paglia's assertion that date rape is sex as usual148
or to the idea that rape is the woman's fault and that sexuality is
necessarily violent and barely controlled, we will not succeed in increasing
the number of convictions for rape or in deterring rape via the criminal law
regardless of the law on the books.
Recognizing that the criminal law's requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and society's reluctance to punish men for heterosexual
acts that fall within cultural understandings of sex, some feminists have
urged that rape victims should use tort law to sue the men who raped
144. See, e.g., MARSH Er AL., supra note 45, at 14-19 (1982) (describing legislators' resistance to
reform of rape law in Michigan).
145. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 2, at 14-27 (discussing renewed attacks on rape victim's credibility,
erosions in rape shield protections, and threats of psychiatric examinations of complainants).
146. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 172-73.
147. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
148. See Paglia, supra note 63, at 38 (positing that pornography does not cause rape or violence and
women should let "men be men").
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them. 149 A civil action gives the victim control over the process, avoids
the problem of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and does not entail
imprisonment for the offender, undoubtedly a source of the reluctance to
convict on the part of some juries. I have no objection to using civil as
well as criminal law to address the problem of rape, but I do not think it
gets us much farther in the context of the stories we tell about
heterosexuality. Although the burden of proof is less stringent in civil
cases, the reluctance to think that anything but the most stereotypical rape
is rape and the belief in male innocence still affect perceptions. The
definition of sexual assault still allows for a consent defense, although it
might be easier to have strict liability notions imported into the civil law.
Further, as the Tyson defense tried to suggest, the possibility of a civil
action for the crime of rape can be used to undermine the victim's
credibility if she also is involved in a criminal prosecution.
150
Impeachment on the basis of prospects of financial gain is a matter of
concern for those of us working to establish women's credibility. Finally,
unless the defendant is financially well off, it may not be economically
worthwhile to sue him. Thus, many of the underlying problems in the
interpretation of rape law remain. 151
The proposed Violence Against Women Act of 1991152 provides for
federal suits for punitive and compensatory damages on the basis of sex
discrimination in cases involving violence against women, including sexual
assault. 153 The impetus behind the legislation included an understanding
that crimes of violence against women constitute gender discrimination and
deprive women of their civil rights, provided the plaintiff can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the violence was committed because of,
or on the basis, of gender. 154 Unless the federal courts are willing to
adopt MacKinnon's argument that rape and sexual assaults are by definition
sex discrimination, and are therefore crimes "motivated by gender, because
of gender or on the basis of gender," 155 the cause of action will be of
149. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL-
L. REv. 777, 814-35 (1988) (discussing the development in some jurisdictions of tort actions based upon
physical force, economic pressure, and deception in sexual encounters, and the varying success and
potential of each approach).
150. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
151. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINIsM
UNMODIFIED 103, 112-13, 150 (1987) (discussing the fact that the credibility of rape victims is often
discounted and the standard applied in cases handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission);
cf. Susan Estrich, Sec at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 816 (1991) (noting difficulties of proof in sexual
harassment cases and the parallels with the interpretation of rape).
152. S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
153. Id. at § 301 (providing for a cause of action against persons who commit crimes of violence
motivated by gender).
154. Id. at §§ 301(d)(1) - e(1).
155. See MacKinnon, supra note 70, at 1306-08 (arguing that because sexual assault should not be
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little more than symbolic value. Particularly because several states have
gender-neutral sexual assault laws, 156 courts plausibly could accept the
argument that rape or sexual assault can be committed against men, too,
as they briefly did in sexual harassment cases, so it is not automatically a
crime of gender bias.' 57 Determinations about what evidence would be
sufficient to demonstrate bias, and the meanings of "because of" and "on
the basis of" gender also could effectively render the cause of action
meaningless. Given the general resistance of the federal judiciary to the
Violence Against Women Act, 158 it is unlikely that the legislation, even
if passed and signed into law, would be an effective legal remedy for rape
survivors, although it might have symbolic value.
What then do we do? We do not stop trying for legal reforms and
challenges where necessary. The mens rea of negligence as to consent is
preferable to one of knowledge, for example. Having rape shield statutes
is necessary; defending these statutes against claims that a man's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation allows him to impugn the character of
his victim is also necessary. Using civil suits is necessary. Supporting
practices that prevent disclosure of a rape survivor's name while supporting
those who come forward is important.
But, ultimately, we have to challenge and change our cultural stories
of heterosexuality so that men are held responsible for what they do with
their penises and sexual abuse of women does not go unrecognized by the
legal system. We do this by telling our stories of rape and sexual abuse,
to be sure, but we also do it by telling a story of mutual responsibility,
pleasure, and care in heterosexuality. In doing so, perhaps we can move
on the continuum between rape and sex to a place where sex is understood
not to be the submission of a terrified, or even worried, woman in the
giving self category, but, rather, a mutual sharing between persons who
recognize each others' humanity, even if-especially if-that includes
recognition of each others' vulnerability and capacity for pleasure and pain.
treated as gender neutral, current sexual assault law should be subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny).
156. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-9-11 (Michie
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1111 (West 1993); Tax. PENAL CODEANN. §22.011 (Vernon 1993);
see also EsnucHl, supra note 5, at 81 (discussing gender neutral language).
157. See MAcKINNON, supra note 151, at 107-108 (discussing the possibility of defendants using a
bisexual defense).
158. See Judith Resnik, Hearing Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1333, 1344-45 (1992) (noting that tha
U.S. Judicial Conference of the United States, the voice of the federal judiciary, issued a report opposing
passage of the Violence Against Women Act because, among other things, issues of domestic violence are
best left to state courts); David Savage, Rehnquist Says New Laws Burden Courts, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1,
1992, at Al, A12 ("The proposal to allow civil suits for sexual assault 'would involve tie federal courts
in a whole host of domestic-relatioas disputes.'")(quoting J. Rehnquist).
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APPENDIX A
TENTATIVE CONTINUUM OF PRESENT CULTURAL
UNDERSTANDING OF "RAPE" AND "SEX" IN HETEROSEXUAL
ENCOUNTERS IN THE UNITED STATES
LYNNE HENDERSON
COMPLETE STRANGER,
RAPE INTERRACIAL
(BLACK ON WHITE)
WEAPONS
ACTUAL VIOLENCE,
VISIBLE INJURY
SOMETIMES
"RAPE"
SOMETIMES THREATS,
"SEX" IMPLIED VIOLENCE
NO IGNORED, OVERBORNE,
INTOXICATED VICTIM
"GIVING SELF"
CONFUSION,
AMBIVALENCE,
RELENTING, -BAD SEX"
"SEX"
MUTUAL RECOGNITION,
AGENCY
MUTUAL DESIRE, LIKING,
COMMUNICATIONI.
MUTUAL DESIRE, LOVE,
CARE, COMMUNICATION

